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Abstract
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously 
vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inef-
ficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other interme-
diary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To 
study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to con-
tribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a 
series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public 
good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally com-
mitted to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, 
the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation 
environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
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1 Introduction
In threshold public good games, players choose how much (money, time or effort) to 
contribute towards a public good that will provide benefits only if total contributions 
exceed a minimum level. Such games can be used to model strategic contribution 
decisions involving crowdfunding projects, social movements, and charitable giving. 
In the games, individuals choose how much to contribute to a common cause, while 
recognizing that their contribution may have a meaningful impact only if the cause 
also receives enough support from others to be viable. For example, philanthropists 
who wish to support the construction of a new community arts center recognize that 
their contribution will only have its intended effect if total contributions from all 
donors are high enough for the project to move forward. Except in the case of very 
large donors who can unilaterally ensure the success of a project, donors prefer to 
contribute to projects that receive enough funding from others to be viable, but not 
so much funding from others that the marginal impact of their own contribution is 
low.
Further complicating the donor decision is the fact that, in many settings, multiple 
projects or opportunities simultaneously vie for donor funding. Donors must choose 
not only how much to contribute, but also to which projects or charities to contrib-
ute. In these settings, donors are exposed to the additional risk that they inefficiently 
spread contributions too thinly across projects. Corazzini et al. (2015) (henceforth 
CCV) extend the threshold public good environment to allow for multiple public 
goods simultaneously vying for funding, and show how increasing the number of 
public goods can discourage giving, decrease total contributions and increase the 
probability that all public goods fail.
The present paper extends the multiple threshold public good environment from 
CCV to allow for strategic delegation.1 Here, donors may provide their contribu-
tions to an intermediary, which then chooses how to allocate total contributions 
across potential uses. The presence of an intermediary has the potential to simplify 
donor strategies and reduce coordination problems. No longer must one choose how 
to allocate contributions across alternative projects. One must simply choose how 
much to contribute, leaving the decision about where to contribute in the hands of 
the intermediary. The use of delegation strategies may avoid situations where con-
tributions are spread inefficiently across projects. The presence of an intermediary 
could therefore encourage contributions and increase the probability that public 
goods successfully reach their funding thresholds.
Intermediaries are common in real world philanthropic environments (Chlass 
et  al. 2015; Coffman 2017; Giving.USA.Foundation 2018). Americans gave 
more than 410 billion to charity in 2017 (2.1% of the GDP). Voluntary contri-
butions represented 70% of total giving of which only 2% did not flow through 
1 The literature review discusses several recent papers that extend CCV in other directions.
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organizations and intermediaries (Giving.USA.Foundation 2018). Many large 
non-profits are involved with a variety of projects and choose how to allocate 
contributions they receive across alternative uses. Furthermore, some prominent 
organizations exist with the specific mission of encouraging and coordinating 
philanthropic efforts for their causes or within their communities.
At the cause level, for example, the Susan G. Komen Foundation raised 
approximately $400 million to reduce cancer deaths during the 2009–2010 fiscal 
year. The organization then choose how to allocate its funds across related activi-
ties such as funding various research projects (21%), education campaigns (39%), 
providing cancer screening and treatment (19%), and fundraising and administra-
tion (21%) (Susan G. Komen Foundation 2010). At the community level, com-
munity chest organizations such as the United Way operate in many locations to 
encourage and coordinate local donor efforts. In 2016, United Way pooled funds 
from more than 9 million individual donors and 60, 000 corporate partners for a 
total of $4.7 billion raised. It also managed a network of 1, 200 local offices in 
40 different countries and coordinated the volunteer efforts of 2.9 million indi-
viduals. The funding activities and the volunteer efforts supported projects in 
1800communities, serving more than 60 million people (UnitedWay 2016; Econ-
omist 2017).
Typically, individuals choose how much to contribute to their preferred cause’s 
foundation or a local United Way. Then the organization decides how to allocate 
the sum of its contributions across many viable projects and organizations in order 
to maximize the social impact of the donations. By contributing through the United 
Way or related organizations, individuals do not need to strategize about whether 
their own donations are optimal given the allocation decisions of others. They sim-
ply choose how much to give and defer to the intermediary organization to allocate 
their contributions across projects in the optimal way.
After incorporating an intermediary organization into a repeated multiple thresh-
old public good game, we show experimentally that the effectiveness of such organi-
zations depends heavily on the formal restrictions placed on its use of donor funds.
First, we consider an environment in which the intermediary is under no obliga-
tion to allocate donor funds to a use that is valued by the donors. This need not 
be interpreted as illegal theft or embezzlement of funds, but, rather, it captures the 
possibility that an organization may be able to direct contributions towards increas-
ing its staff size or salaries, or towards projects that are unrelated to the projects 
donors hoped to fund. However, just because an intermediary can expropriate fund-
ing doesn’t mean that it will do so. Intermediaries may feel obligated to use funding 
in accordance with donor expectations, especially in dynamic environments where 
fund use today may affect future donations.
Second, we consider an alternative version of the environment in which a “des-
tination rule” formally requires that the intermediary pass along the entire value of 
the donors’ delegated contributions to public goods. Redirecting all or part of the 
delegated contributions for private benefit is no longer possible. Such a destination 
rule is consistent with non-profit sector regulations or public commitments made by 
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NGOs that generally improve transparency regarding the use of funds and limit the 
share of contributions that can be directed to overhead or administrative costs.2
In both environments, the presence of an intermediary may reduce the risk of 
donors contributing to projects that do not receive enough support from others to be 
viable. In doing so, the presence of an intermediary may potentially encourage con-
tributions and increase public good success and payoffs. In the unrestricted delega-
tion environment, however, donors face a dimension of risk that is not present with 
a destination rule: they face uncertainty about whether the intermediary will work 
in the public interest, and risk that their contributions will not be passed along to a 
public good. Regardless of whether the intermediary intends to behave outside of 
the public interest, donors face the possibility that it might.
The relative risk associated with contributing is lower in the delegation game with 
a destination rule than it is in either the game without delegation or the game with 
unrestricted delegation. We therefore expect delegation to increase contributions and 
public good success when intermediaries face restrictions on their use of funds. It 
is less clear, however, whether the presence of an intermediary will increase con-
tributions and public good success when there is no destination rule. Unrestricted 
delegation reduces the risk of mis-coordination among donors, while simultaneously 
introducing the risk of intermediary expropriation. Which dimension of risk is more 
effective at discouraging contributions is an empirical question, which we consider 
experimentally.
In the laboratory experiment, we show that the presence of an intermediary 
increases success of public goods and overall welfare only in the setting with a des-
tination rule. With a destination rule, the ability to delegate donations has a sig-
nificant positive impact on public good funding, including coordination, success 
rates and payoffs. When the intermediary does not face formal restrictions on the 
use of funds, however, donors contribute even less than in the case without an inter-
mediary. Without a destination rule, the presence of an intermediary does not help 
increase contributions or improve public good success, leading to worse outcomes 
for groups and less success for the public goods they are trying to support.
Together, these results suggest that an intermediary organization can help facili-
tate coordination among donors and successful funding of public goods. For this to 
be the case, however, donors must have reason to believe that the intermediary will 
use their donations effectively. Without this confidence, the presence of an interme-
diary can decrease contributions and public good success.
Our findings highlight the potential for community chest organizations and other 
intermediaries, and the benefits from such organizations restricting how they are 
able to use donations ahead of any funding drive. They also illustrate a channel 
through which regulations and oversight of charitable organizations, such as rules 
2 It is also related to donors adding conditions to their contributions that require funding to be spent in 
certain ways. Large donors often add restrictions to an organization’s use of their funds. There is not only 
a moral obligation for non-profits to honor donor’s wishes, but they are also required by law to do so 
(Brody 1998; Bac 2002; Goodwin 2005; Atkinson 2008). Under destination rules, NGOs must be careful 
in choosing how to use donations as, in case they do not comply with the initial intent, donors can take 
legal action, resulting in substantial monetary and reputation costs for the intermediary.
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governing the portion of donations that may be directed to administration, may facil-
itate donations and lead to more successful charitable giving.
2  Literature review
There is a substantial and growing literature using laboratory experiments to con-
sider the decisions of individuals to contribute to public goods. Within this litera-
ture, our analysis is most related to the papers that consider the allocation of con-
tributions across multiple goods (e.g. Blackwell and McKee 2003; Moir 2006; 
Bernasconi et al. 2009) and the papers which focus on threshold public goods (Bag-
noli and Lipman 1989; Andreoni and Gee 2015), which is sometimes used to model 
donor contributions to charitable organizations and fundraising projects (Andreoni 
1989, 1998).
Several recent papers, beginning with CCV (first discussed in the introduction), 
consider environments in which donors allocate contributions across several differ-
ent threshold public goods. Such a framework is a stylized representation of an envi-
ronment in which multiple charities or fundraising projects simultaneously vie for 
donations. CCV show how increasing the number of public goods in such an envi-
ronment can make coordination among donors more difficult to achieve, which dis-
courages donations and makes it less likely that any public good succeeds. Several 
recent papers consider related extensions of this framework. Ansink et  al. (2017) 
considers the impact of seed money on contributions and extends the framework 
to allow for giving in continuous time. Cason and Zubrickas (2018) and Liu et al. 
(2016) considers the impact of rebates when a public good fails to achieve its thresh-
old on contributions in a multiple good setting.3 These papers consider various 
aspects of how inefficiencies arise as multiple projects vie for funding. Our paper 
contributes to this literature by exploring the role of donation intermediaries.
The idea that delegation can improve coordination has been well studied in a vari-
ety of other strategic environments. Theoretical analysis of the topic focuses mainly 
on principle-agent settings (e.g. Aghion and Tirole 1997; van den Steen 2006; Ham-
mon et al. 2010) and the theory of firm (e.g. Vickers 1985). Empirical research on 
delegation has devoted attention to contexts such as corporate governance (e.g. 
Alfoldi et al. 2012), management (e.g Sengul et al. 2012) and labour relations (e.g. 
Charness and Sutter 2012). Our focus on delegation in charitable giving represents 
a novel focus of research. Furthermore, our evidence shows how delegation can 
decrease outcome efficiency when preferences donor and intermediary preferences 
are not fully aligned. This is related to the work on trust-related concerns between 
principals and the delegated entities. Opportunistic behavior, essentially related to 
free-riding (e.g. Gur and Bjørnskov 2017; Herz et al. 2016; Löschel and Rübbelke 
2014; Brown et  al. 2012) leads to delegation failures and sub-optimal outcomes. 
Hidden costs of the intermediation such as inefficient administration and embezzle-
ment (e.g. Chlass et al. 2015; Di Falco et al. 2016), as well as explicit prices like 
3 See also Bouma et al. (2018).
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overhead fees (e.g. Gneezy et al. 2014; Butera and Houser 2018) represent further 
aspects that negatively affect intermediation, especially in charitable giving con-
texts. In our experiments, we compare outcomes in a setting in which a delegate is 
unable to act outside of the interests of the others players and a setting in which del-
egate behavior is unrestricted (and trust-related concerns are relevant). This allows 
us to identify the degree to which such concerns affect donor behavior and outcomes 
in our environment.
Related to our paper, a recent strand of experimental research has confirmed 
the positive effects generated by delegation-based mechanisms in voluntary con-
tribution settings. In this literature, the discretionary power on financing a public 
good is given to intermediaries, either endogenously elected by the group mem-
bers (e.g. Hamman et  al. 2011; Bernard et  al. 2013; Kocher et  al. 2018) or exog-
enously appointed (e.g. Oxoby 2013; Makowsky et al. 2014; Hauge and Rogeberg 
2015). Bolle and Vogel (2011) examine the effect of using either an endogenous or 
an exogenous procedure to appoint the intermediary, finding that both delegation 
schemes stimulate the provision of public goods in the short run. Taking another 
approach, Kocher et al. (2018) study the effect of delegation when a global public 
good benefits multiple groups of agents and investigate whether welfare increases 
when groups delegate the contribution decision to a single (delegated) player. 
Results show that electoral delegation substantially increases inter-group coopera-
tion, and that re-election incentives prevent representatives from excessive exploita-
tion of their constituents. Bernard et al. (2013), Stoddard et al. (2014), and Stoddard 
et al. (2019) consider a similar problem devising a tragedy-of-the-commons game in 
which players choose how much to extract from a common pool of resources. They 
provide further supporting evidence on the general conclusion that delegation can 
lead to higher payoffs, in this case reducing the severity of tragedy of the commons. 
None of these papers focus on delegation in a multiple public good or threshold pub-
lic good environment.
A connected stream of literature looks at the role of leadership on voluntary pro-
vision of public goods. Leaders are defined as the first movers in choosing contribu-
tions to a public good. A leader’s contribution is observed by other group members 
before they choose their own individual contributions. It is found that leaders, by 
setting a virtuous example, can positively influence followers’ contributions both 
in public good (Levati et al. 2007; Rivas and Sutter 2011; Jack and Recalde 2015; 
Drouvelis et  al. 2017) and common pool settings (Buchholz and Sandler 2017). 
Delegation, as we consider in our experiment, represents an alternative means of 
improving contributions.
3  Experimental design
Our experimental design extends the multiple threshold public good setting of CCV 
to include treatments in which subjects can delegate their contributions to one group 
member (the “intermediary”) who then decides how to allocate the delegated contri-
butions across different public goods.
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We present results from three distinct treatments with multiple public goods, 
using a between-subject design:
• No delegation (NoDel)—Benchmark treatment with multiple public goods and 
no delegation based on the setting in CCV.
• Delegation without restriction (Del)—Treatment with multiple public goods and 
the option to delegate contribution to an intermediary but with no destination 
rule.
• Delegation with destination rule (DelRule)—Treatment with multiple public 
goods, the option to delegate contributions to an intermediary and a destination 
rule restricting her behavior.
In the last part of the data analysis, we also report results from three additional and 
analogous treatments in which there is only one available public good, NoDel[1], 
Del[1], DelRule[1], that are intended to disentangle the role played by multiplicity 
of public goods in mediating the effects of delegation.
72 subjects participated in each treatment, for a total of 432 participants in the 
experiment. In each of the treatments, 18 groups of four participants were formed. 
These groups were kept constant throughout the experiment. Each group partici-
pated in a repeated threshold public good contribution game with 12 rounds of rep-
etition. Subjects received feedback about the results at the end of each round. We 
describe the treatments in detail below.
3.1  No delegation treatments
In every period of NoDel, each participant is endowed with 55 tokens. Participants 
independently and simultaneously choose how to divide their endowment between a 
“private account” and twelve “collective accounts”, indexed by n. For each token put 
into his own private account, a subject receives a return of two points. Each token 
put into a collective account n returns a benefit of Bn to all players. The benefit asso-
ciated with a collective account depends on total contributions to that account from 
all players, denoted Cn , with
where bn ∈ {20, 30} denotes the bonus associated with that good. When total con-
tributions to n do not achieve the threshold of 132 tokens, the contributions to that 
good are forfeited. When they reach or exceed the threshold, all players benefit 
equally. The threshold is set at 60% of the total endowment, assuring that at most 
one public good can be effectively funded.4 Four of the collective accounts offer 
bonuses bn = 30 and eight offer bn = 20 . Otherwise, the goods are identical.
(1)Bn(Cn) =
{
0 when Cn < 132
Cn + bn when Cn ≥ 132,
4 The marginal per capita return to the collective account equals 0.5 meaning that the marginal return to 
a subject from successfully contributing to a collective account (namely, once the threshold is reached) is 
half the return from the private account.
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In the single public good environment with no delegation, NoDel[1], the collec-
tive account has a threshold of 132 and offers a bonus of 30 in case of successful 
contribution.
3.2  Delegation treatments
We extend the multiple threshold public good environment to allow for delegation in 
two ways. Treatments Del and DelRule add an initial stage to the NoDel treatment in 
which group members can make transfers to an intermediary player. There are still 
four group members, each endowed with 55 tokens, and three of the group members 
can transfer any number of tokens between 0 and 55 to the fourth group member. In 
the second stage, players contribute to public goods in the same way that they did 
under NoDel except that their updated endowments reflect the first stage transfers. 
The only difference between Del and DelRule concerns restrictions placed on the 
intermediary’s use of the transferred funds in the second stage. In Del, there are 
no restrictions in how the intermediary may allocate the transfers received between 
public goods and her private account. In DelRule, the intermediary cannot direct 
transfers received from other players to her own private account; she must direct 
transfers to a public good.
In the two treatments with a single collective account, Del[1] and DelRule[1], 
delegation is based on the same experimental features used in Del and DelRule.
3.3  Procedures
Upon their arrival to the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer 
terminal. At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were distributed and 
read aloud (see the online Supplementary Material for the instructions used in 
DelRule). Before the first period started, subjects were asked to answer control 
questions at their terminal to ascertain their understanding of the procedure and 
instructions. Subjects’ questions about procedures and instructions were answered 
privately.
In each period of Del and DelRule (and later Del[1] and DelRule[1]), subjects 
participated in two consecutive phases: a delegation phase and a contribution phase. 
At the beginning of the delegation phase, the computer randomly chose one of the 
group members to serve as an intermediary, and subjects were privately informed 
about their role.5 Non-intermediary group members simultaneously chose how 
much of the initial endowment to transfer to the intermediary. The intermediary did 
not make any choice in the delegation phase. At the end of the delegation phase, 
subjects received feedback on the overall amount transferred to the intermediary, 
and their own updated endowment that they would have access to in the contribution 
5 More precisely, in every period, the probability of a group member to be assigned to the role of del-
egate was kept equal to 25% and independent across repetitions.
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phase. For the non-intermediaries, this equaled 55 minus any transfer they made in 
the first stage. For the intermediary, this equaled 55 plus the sum of transfers from 
others.
At the beginning of the contribution phase, each subject was presented with a 
number of bins (on the terminal screen) equal to the total number of private and col-
lective accounts (thirteen in NoDel, Del, and DelRule; two in NoDel[1], Del[1], and 
DelRule[1]).6 Each of the twelve boxes of the collective accounts showed the thresh-
old and the size of the corresponding bonus.
The twelve collective accounts were divided into two groups. Four were efficient, 
assigning a bonus of 30 points in case the group contributed more than the thresh-
old, and eight were inefficient, with a respective bonus of 20 points. The four effi-
cient public goods were randomly selected in periods 1, 5, and 9, and were kept 
unchanged for four consecutive periods. The random reshuffle of the efficient public 
goods every four periods was motivated by two important considerations. First, it 
allows us to investigate the effects of delegation in settings characterized by mis-
coordination, still preserving the possibility that, in subsequent periods, subjects 
could develop coordination over multiple alternatives even without delegating 
resources. For instance, subjects could simply use contributions to signal to the other 
group members the alternative to opt for in the next period.7 Second, we believe 
that reshuffling the public goods captures an important feature of the real world. As 
much as social needs continuously emerge overtime (consider for instance interven-
ing after earthquakes and other natural disasters, supporting schools, communities, 
sick people), also charitable options are strongly volatile and change overtime. In 
these situations, donors do not have enough experience and information to success-
fully coordinate their actions on the same option.8
At the end of every period, each subject was informed about the number of 
tokens allocated by the group to each collective account, whether the corresponding 
6 In order to minimize frame effects associated with letter or number labels, the twelve collective 
accounts in NoDel, Del, and DelRule were labeled using colors: white, yellow, green, red, light blue, 
blue, gray, violet, brown, pink, black, and orange. Also, subjects in these treatments were told that the 
order of (but not the label associated with) the boxes of the collective accounts on their screen was ran-
domly determined by the computer in every period.
7 At the same time, we did not want to reshuffle every period in order to preserve the possibility that 
subjects could effectively use past experience (instead of delegation) to guide their contribution decisions 
after achieving coordination. Our experimental design was chosen to allow for several high-likelihood-
of-mis-coordination periods and other more-stable periods in the same setting.
8 To better analyze the impact of delegation on coordination and contributions in a setting with multiple 
public goods, the present experimental design departs from the original one introduced by CCV in the 
number of collective accounts as well as in how heterogeneity is manipulated. First, having 12 (instead 
of 4 in CCV) collective accounts guarantees that (i) the set containing the efficient alternatives can be 
entirely changed every four periods and (ii) each alternative is included in the set of efficient accounts 
for a single 4-period block only. Second, differently from CCV, both the sets of efficient and inefficient 
collective accounts contain multiple indistinguishable alternatives (more precisely, as mentioned above, 
4 efficient and 8 inefficient accounts). Therefore, even under the hypothesis (validated by CCV) that sub-
jects focus their attention on the most efficient collective accounts, they still face the risk of mis-coordi-
nating contributions on different alternatives, as none of the efficient collective accounts in a 4-period 
block is focal. Therefore, at least in the first of each 4-period block, delegation can help mitigate the 
coordination problem, still preserving the possibility that groups develop different coordination strategy.
 L. Corazzini et al.
1 3
threshold was reached, and any bonus paid. Additionally, following each period, 
subjects learned the number of points they received from each account and in total.
The experiment took place at the Bocconi Experimental Laboratory for Social 
Sciences (BELSS) at Bocconi University, Milan, in June 2017. Participants were 
mainly undergraduate students recruited using the SONA recruitment system.9 The 
experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). At the 
end of the experiment, points earned by subjects were converted at an exchange rate 
of 1 euro per 120 points and monetary earnings were paid in cash privately. On aver-
age, subjects earned 14.50 euros for sessions lasting 60 min, including the time for 
instructions and payments. Before leaving the laboratory, subjects completed a short 
questionnaire containing questions on their socio-demographics and their perception 
of the experimental task.
4  Delegation and multiplicity: theoretical insights and testable 
predictions
In this section, we present a game theoretic model of threshold public goods adapted 
from CCV. We then discuss how this model may be extended to incorporate delega-
tion rules, and the impact of these extensions on the predictions of the model (in the 
Online Appendix, we provide a formal analysis). This discussion leads to several 
testable hypotheses, which guide the experimental design and analysis.
4.1  Model of threshold public goods without delegation
There are J players, indexed j ∈ {1,… , J} . Each player receives an endowment y at 
the beginning of the game. Players simultaneously decide how much of their private 
endowment to contribute to each of N public goods. The contribution of player j to 
good n is denoted by cj,n ≥ 0 . Let Cn ≡
∑
j cj,n and cj =
∑N
n=1
cj,n denote the aggre-
gate contributions to good n and the total contributions made by player j, respec-
tively. A player’s total donations cannot exceed his endowment: cj ∈ [0, y].
Function Bn(Cn) = B(Cn) determines the benefit each player receives from public 
good n. The benefit depends on whether total contributions reach some contribution 
threshold,  , below which the public good fails to return any benefit. For each good 
n,
When the threshold is reached, the public good returns a benefit to each player that 
is increasing in total contributions, plus a bonus of bn associated with good n. Any 
unit of endowment not contributed to a public good gets directed to private con-
sumption, where it returns a marginal benefit of two (implying a marginal per capita 
(2)Bn(Cn) =
{
0 when Cn < 𝜏
Cn + bn when Cn ≥ 𝜏.
9 http://www.sona-syste ms.com/defau lt.aspx.
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return to the public good is 1 / 2 that from private consumption). Therefore, player j 
earns total payoff:
We assume that J = 4 , y = 55 ,  = 132 and bn ∈ {20, 30} . These are the parameters 
incorporated into our experiment. They assure that groups can fund at most one pub-
lic good at its threshold, that players are unable and unwilling to unilaterally fund a 
good at its threshold, and that players prefer to contribute to a public good only if 
they expect that others are also contributing to the same public good.
CCV consider such a framework, showing that there exists two type of equilibria. 
First, there exists an equilibrium in which players contribute nothing to any of the 
public goods. Second, for each of the public goods, there exists equilibria in which 
the groups provide contributions to that good exactly equal to the threshold, while 
providing no contributions to any other good. There are N + 1 symmetric equilibria: 
one in which cn,j = 0 for all n and j, and one for each good n in which each player 
contributes cn,j = ∕J = 33 and cm,j = 0 for all m ≠ n.
The threshold public good environment is a coordination game in which players 
want to contribute to a public good only if they expect that others are also contribut-
ing to the same good. Furthermore, the size of the contribution they want to provide 
depends on the contributions they expect others to provide.
As the number of goods N increases, the coordination problem among donors 
becomes more challenging. Even if a player expects that others will provide a con-
tribution, it becomes less likely that everyone’s contribution will go towards the 
same good, and more likely that the player’s own contribution will be directed to 
an underfunded good and, therefore, wasted. This mis-coordination problem is the 
focus of CCV, who argue that additional goods increases the risk of mis-coordinat-
ing contributions, making it more likely that players focus on the low-risk strategies 
that are associated with the no-contribution equilibrium.
When players interact over several periods, there are even more equilibria to con-
sider, but the main insights from the model regarding how adding multiple goods 
discourages donations continue to hold.
4.2  Allowing delegation
To incorporate delegation into the threshold public good framework, we add to the 
game an initial stage in which one of the four players, i, is appointed to serve as the 
intermediary, and then the other players choose how much of their endowments to 
transfer to player i. Denote player j’s transfer by dj ∈ [0, y] , and let D =
∑
j≠i dj . In 
the second stage of each period, all four players simultaneously choose how to dis-
tribute their endowments across the N public goods and their private account just as 
they did in the game without delegation; except here their endowments are updated 
to reflect the first stage transfers.
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We consider two versions of the delegation game. In the first, player i faces no 
restrictions on her allocation of the transfers received from other players. She can 
direct as much or as little of the funds to her private account as well as to the public 
good as she chooses. In the second version, player i faces a “destination rule” requir-
ing that any transfer from another player in the first stage be passed along to a public 
good in the second stage; the transfers cannot be directed to the intermediary’s pri-
vate account.
In the delegation environment with a destination rule, there exists equilibria in 
which the donors only contribute through the intermediary, who then funds one of 
the public goods at its threshold. For example, there exist equilibria in which each 
non-intermediary player provides some transfer dj to the intermediary, who then 
contributes ci,n = 132 to one of the public goods. When players choose such strate-
gies as part of an equilibrium, there is no need to correctly anticipate which of the 
other goods the other players are going to contribute to. The non-intermediaries sim-
ply choose how much to contribute, and the intermediary then chooses the public 
good to fund using the groups’ contributions. Such equilibria continue to exist in the 
repeated version of the game.
In the delegation environment with unrestricted transfers, there does not exist 
equilibria of the non-repeated game in which other players only contribute through 
the intermediary. The intermediary has an incentive to expropriate contributions for 
her own use rather than pass along enough transfers to reach a funding threshold. 
Because of this, in a one-shot game, any equilibrium that involves funding a pub-
lic good entails players coordinating direct contributions on the same good. Some 
moderate amount of delegation may exist in equilibrium, but not to the extent that it 
simplifies the coordination problem among donors; it does not eliminate the need to 
anticipate where others will contribute as part of equilibrium.
In the repeated version of the delegation game with unrestricted transfers, del-
egation can be more helpful. This is because the presence of repeated interactions 
between the same set of players allow them to play conditional strategies, which can 
introduce the potential threat that players will stop contributing to any public good 
after an intermediary acts outside of the groups’ interests. Using such strategies, one 
may construct equilibria in which non-intermediaries provide contributions only 
through the intermediary, except for in the last periods of play when players don’t 
need the intermediary to coordinate if they simply continue to fund the same good 
that was funded in the previous periods. Although delegation can help groups reduce 
the risk of contributing to different goods in the repeated environment, this requires 
more complex conditional strategies than in the presence of a delegation rule.
4.3  Testable predictions
The theoretical analysis (see Online Appendix A) provides several predictions that 
help guide the experimental analysis.
In the multiple public good environment without delegation, CCV showed that 
players often focused on less-risky strategies. As the risk of mis-coordination 
increased, players were more likely to play the least risky strategy and contribute 
1 3
Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public…
nothing to any of the public goods. In the above discussion, we considered how 
delegating contributions through an intermediary changes the risk of providing 
contributions.
Delegating contributions can reduce the risk that a donor effectively wastes his 
contribution by contributing to a different good than other donors. This reduc-
tion in risk is likely to increase the probability that players provide contributions 
(through an intermediary), which in turn increases the probability that a public 
good reaches its funding threshold.
At the same time, however, delegating contributions can increase the risks that 
the intermediary redirect money away from public good funding for her private 
gain. This is a possibility in the game with unrestricted delegation, but not in the 
environment with a destination rule. Although the theory shows that delegation 
can exist as part of equilibrium in both environments, the strategies involved in 
such equilibria are much more complicated in the game with unrestricted del-
egation than in the game with a destination rule, as conditional strategies and 
dynamic incentives are required to reduce the risk that the intermediary expropri-
ates transfers.
These insights suggest that the probability that a public good succeeds will be 
higher in the game with delegation and a destination rule than in either the game 
without delegation or the game with unrestricted delegation. The theory does not 
provide clear predictions regarding the comparison of outcomes in the game with-
out delegation and the game with unrestricted delegation. Compared to the multi-
ple public good framework without delegation, unrestricted delegation reduces the 
risks associated with contributing on one dimension, while introducing a new risk 
on another dimension. Whether contributions and donor coordination increase or 
decrease in the game with unrestricted delegation will depend on whether the risk 
of mis-coordination or the risk of intermediary expropriation are viewed as more 
significant concerns for donors. This is an empirical question, which we consider in 
the experimental analysis below.
5  Experimental results
In the first part of the section, we focus our attention on the treatments with multiple 
public goods: NoDel, Del, and DelRule. We explore differences across treatments in 
overall contributions, coordination, the delegated amount, and delegation behavior. 
In the last part of the section, we discuss results from the three analogous treatments 
with a single public good, NoDel[1], Del[1], and DelRule[1], to investigate how the 
effects of delegation are mediated by multiplicity of public goods.
In the statistical analysis, we use both non-parametric and parametric techniques. 
The non-parametric tests are based on independent observations at the group level. 
Moreover, when looking at differences across treatments over all periods, we will 
also discuss results from the bootstrap-based methodology developed by List et al. 
(2019) to test multiple null hypotheses simultaneously in experimental settings with 
multiple treatments.
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Concerning the parametric analysis, in order to account for potential dependence 
across periods, the estimated coefficients are based on standard errors clustered at 
the group level.
5.1  Total contributions
Figure 1 shows the mean total contributions to the collective accounts over periods 
in NoDel, Del and DelRule.
Averaging over all periods, subjects contribute 24.46 tokens in NoDel, 16.66 
in Del, and 30.01 tokens in DelRule. Contributions in NoDel are placed between 
those in Del and DelRule and are characterized by higher volatility across periods. 
Downward peaks in total contributions observed in the NoDel treatment occur in 
the reshuffling periods (1, 5, and 9) and are followed by sustained contributions in 
the next three periods, suggesting that moderate contributions in reshuffling periods 
enable groups to coordinate higher contributions in the following three repetitions.
Table  1 reports results from parametric, random effects panel regressions to 
assess the statistical relevance of these preliminary observations.
Column (1) compares contributions in NoDel with those observed in Del and 
DelRule to assess the effects of delegation in a setting characterized by multiple 
collective accounts. The negative and significant ( p < 0.05 ) coefficient of the treat-
ment dummy Del indicates that introducing delegation with no destination rule 
is detrimental for cooperation, as it reduces contributions relative to the baseline 
treatment with no delegation, NoDel. Instead, delegation seems to stimulate con-
tributions in DelRule, when the intermediary is subject to the destination rule. The 
difference in contributions between DelRule and Del is positive and highly sig-
nificant ( p < 0.001 ), while the difference between DelRule and NoDel, although 
positive, does not reach statistical significance ( p = 0.150 ). These results are con-
firmed by non parametric tests. According to a (two-sided) Mann–Whitney rank-
sum test, mean (over all periods) total contributions in Del are significantly lower 
than those in DelRule ( p < 0.001 ) and NoDel ( p < 0.05 ), while no difference is 
detected between DelRule and NoDel ( p = 0.311 ). When accounting for multiple 
null hypotheses testing, the difference in contributions between the two treatments 
Fig. 1  Total contributions with 
multiple collective accounts, by 
treatment and period
1 3
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with delegation, Del and DelRule, remains highly significant ( p = 0.003 ), while that 
between Del and NoDel reaches only marginal significance ( p = 0.095).
Result 1 Delegation is detrimental for contributions when it is not sustained by 
the destination rule. Indeed, subjects make significantly larger total contributions in 
DelRule and NoDel than in Del.
Column (2) investigates the previous result by reporting estimates of the inten-
sive (namely, the part of the treatment effect that concerns the level of the contribu-
tion, conditional on the subject choosing to contribute) and extensive (the part of the 
treatment effect that is attributable to the subject choosing to contribute) margins of 
delegation in Del and DelRule, relative to the treatment with no delegation, NoDel. 
Although the numerical value of the estimates are not directly interpretable, their 
sign and significance level provide further insight that complements Result 1. In par-
ticular, conditional on choosing to contribute, contributions are significantly higher 
in DelRule than in NoDel ( p = 0.001 ). Also contributions in Del are higher than 
in NoDel, although in this case the difference reaches only marginal significance 
( p = 0.078 ). Moving to the extensive margins, we find that subjects are less likely 
to make positive contributions in treatments with delegation (for Del, p = 0.003 ; 
for DelRule, p = 0.005).10 As it will be discussed in the next sections, in Del this 
result effectively captures the inability of subjects to cooperate and coordinate over 
collective accounts. Instead, in DelRule the result is due to the large amount that 
subjects choose to transfer to the delegate, a fact that is further confirmed by the 
high probability to reach the threshold and the high earnings of subjects documented 
in this treatment. Column (3) shows how results in column (1) change when con-
trolling for the past ability of the group to reach the threshold and adding a time 
trend. The coefficient of Coord(t − 1) is positive and highly significant ( p < 0.001 ) 
suggesting that total contributions increase when the group successfully reached the 
threshold in the previous period. Finally, the negative and highly significant coeffi-
cient of the time trend confirms the existence of a decaying pattern in contributions, 
as highlighted by Fig. 1. Both the magnitude and significance of the differences in 
contributions across treatments are not substantially affected by the introduction of 
these two additional covariates: the differences between DelRule and Del or between 
NoDel and Del remain positive and significant (for the two comparisons, p < 0.001 
and p < 0.001 , respectively), while the difference between DelRule and NoDel is not 
significant ( p = 0.322).
Column (4) replicates the analysis in column (3) by adding a number of inter-
action terms to control for (potential) heterogeneous effects of the linear trend and 
the past successful provision across treatments. As shown by the results, all the 
interaction terms are not significant, suggesting that, relative to the baseline, we do 
not detect significant differences in the effects of the covariates between Del and 
DelRule.11
10 Indeed, descriptive statistics suggest that the proportion of subjects contributing nothing to the collec-
tive accounts is 31.83% in NoDel, 64.47% in Del, and 56.25% in DelRule.
11 We also detect no difference between Del and DelRule when performing formal tests to com-
pare the interaction terms for the difference between Del ∗ Trend and DelRule ∗ Trend : p = 0.671 ; 
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We also investigate the relationship between (self-reported) risk tolerance and 
contributions. In the post experimental questionnaire, subjects answered the “gen-
eral risk question” validated by Dohmen et al. (2011): “How willing are you to take 
risks, in general?”, with Respondents answering on a scale from 0 (not willing at 
all) to 10 (very willing). Then, we include the risk tolerance and corresponding 
treatment interactions as additional covariates in columns (1) and (4) of Table 1.12 
We find that risk tolerance significantly increases contributions in NoDel only 
( p = 0.036 in the extended version of column 1 and p = 0.030 in the extended ver-
sion of column 2), while it exerts no significant effects in Del ( p = 0.678 in the 
extended version of column 1 and p = 0.657 in the extended version of column 2) 
as well as in DelRule ( p = 0.136 in the extended version of column 1 and p = 0.190 
in the extended version of column 2). A possible explanation for this result is that 
relatively-more risk averse subjects in NoDel react to the risk of mis-coordination 
by reducing their contributions. Instead, delegation in Del and DelRule represents a 
form of insurance against mis-coordination and, therefore, neutralizes the relation-
ship between risk attitude and contributions.
Columns (5), (6), and (7) focus on each of the three treatments, separately. We are 
mainly interested in assessing whether the three treatments differ from each other in 
the decaying pattern and the effects of reshuffling the efficient collective accounts. 
In order to properly identify the effects of reshuffling, for each treatment, we modify 
the specification in column (3) by adding dummies for periods 1, 5, 9, separately. 
We also include a dummy for period 12 to look at potential ending game effect. 
Finally, we exclude Coord(t − 1) from the three regressions in order to identify the 
effect of period 1.
Concerning the effects of the time trend, we find that contributions significantly 
decline over repetitions in NoDel ( p < 0.001 ) and Del ( p < 0.05 ), while they do not 
exhibit any particular time pattern in DelRule ( p < 0.531).
Every four periods, the four efficient public goods were randomly reshuffled. 
As highlighted by Fig.  1, the effect of reshuffling is strong in NoDel, where sub-
jects cannot use delegation to solve the coordination problem. Indeed, in this treat-
ment, total contributions substantially fall in periods 1, 5 and 9 (for all dummies: 
p < 0.001 ). In Del and DelRule, reshuffling does not have any significant effect on 
contributions.
Result 2 Delegation attenuates the negative effects of reshuffling the relative effi-
ciency of the public goods on total contributions. Moreover, contributions decline 
more rapidly in Del than in DelRule or NoDel.
In a similar experimental setting characterized by multiple threshold collective 
accounts, CCV showed that subjects prefer to contribute to the most efficient alter-
natives, even when the inefficient collective account is salient and might represent 
Footnote 11 (continued)
for the difference between Del ∗ Trend and DelRule ∗ Trend : p = 0.671 ; for the difference between 
Del ∗ Coord(t − 1) and DelRule ∗ Coord(t − 1) : p = 0.355.
12 Detailed results are available upon request. We thank an anonymous Referee for this interesting obser-
vation.
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a coordination device. The tendency to opt for efficient collective accounts finds 
further empirical support in the present paper. Table 2 reports the mean contribu-
tion to efficient and inefficient collective accounts in NoDel, Del, and DelRule, over 
periods.13 According to a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the mean contri-
bution to the efficient collective accounts is, over all periods, substantially higher 
than that to the inefficient alternatives in all treatments ( p < 0.01 ). A more detailed 
look at differences in contributions to the efficient public goods across treatments 
reveals a positive and significant difference between DelRule and Del (according to 
a two-sided Mann–Whitney rank-sum test, p < 0.001 ) as well as between NoDel and 
Del ( p = 0.0576 ), while no significant difference is found when comparing DelRule 
with NoDel ( p = 0.486).14
Table 2  Contributions to efficient and inefficient alternatives with multiple collective accounts
This table reports the mean contributions (standard deviations are reported in parentheses) to efficient 
and inefficient collective accounts in NoDel, Del, DelRule, over periods the table shows significance lev-
els from a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that the difference between the 
contribution to the efficient and inefficient options is null. Significance levels are denoted as follows: 
* p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , and ***p < 0.01
Period 1 1–4 5 5–8 9 9–12 12 All
NoDel
 Eff. pgs 18.560 26.343 11.524 20.193 8.772 18.183 19.472 21.573
(6.327) (11.699) (7.453) (13.453) (9.329) (15.321) (17.901) (12.810)
 I neff. 
pgs
0.516 0.188 4.319 2.701 2.806 2.264 1.972 1.718
(1.945) (0.519) (6.894) (7.512) (8.034) (8.336) (8.367) (5.243)
 Diff. 18.044*** 26.155*** 7.205*** 17.492*** 5.966** 15.919*** 17.500*** 19.855***
Del
 Eff. pgs 21.998 19.441 12.767 15.625 8.399 9.674 6.684 14.913
(16.336) (14.565) (15.889) (14.504) (12.698) (12.486) (12.959) (12.387)
 Ineff. 
pgs
0.425 0.154 2.488 0.644 0.479 0.290 0.625 0.363
(0.857) (0.273) (6.832) (1.704) (1.285) (0.674) (2.358) (0.667)
 Diff. 21.573*** 19.287*** 10.279** 14.981*** 7.920*** 9.384*** 6.059** 14.550***
DelRule
 Eff. pgs 25.285 27.935 26.222 28.426 26.806 24.944 17.396 27.102
(12.639) (8.841) (12.737) (8.944) (11.999) (10.674) (15.245) (8.419)
 I neff. 
pgs
1.303 1.120 0.666 0.318 1.264 1.110 1.940 0.850
(2.857) (2.650) (2.062) (0.752) (4.713) (1.761) (4.875) (1.267)




18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
13 The mean contributions to the efficient (inefficient) collective accounts in a period is given by the 
ratio between the total contributions to the efficient (inefficient) alternatives and the number of efficient 
(inefficient) collective accounts to which, in that period, the subject allocated strictly positive amounts.
14 The same ranking holds true when focusing on total contributions are taken into consideration. 
Finally, due to the small magnitude, we do not analyze differences across treatments in the amount con-
tributed to the inefficient public goods.
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Result 3 With multiple public goods, subjects contribute substantially more to 
more-efficient goods than to less-efficient alternatives.
5.2  Successful provision of collective accounts
We now consider the ability of groups to coordinate contributions on the same pub-
lic good and successfully reach the required threshold. As discussed in the theoreti-
cal section, delegation may reduce the risk of donor coordination. It allows group 
members to centralize the choice of allocating the group’s resources across collec-
tive accounts on the intermediary. Table 3 reports the mean proportions of success-
ful provision in NoDel, Del, and DelRule, over periods.
Over all periods, DelRule is the treatment with the highest percent (66.2%) of 
groups contributing at or above the threshold of one of the collective accounts, fol-
lowed by NoDel (39.4%) and Del (29.6%). According to a Mann–Whitney rank-sum 
test (two-sided), the mean proportion of periods a group reaches the threshold is 
significantly higner in DelRule than in either NoDel ( p = 0.014 ) or Del ( p = 0.003 ). 
Statistical significance of the differences is confirmed when accounting for multiple 
null hypotheses testing, as the difference in proportions between DelRule and Del or 
NoDel remain highly significant (respectively, for the two comparisons: p = 0.006 
and p = 0.021 ), while the difference between Del and NoDel is not significant 
( p = 0.369).
Thus, delegation leads to greater coordination only in DelRule, where the inter-
mediary is constrained by the destination rule to contribute at least as much as she 
receives from the rest of the group.
Result 4 With multiple collective accounts, delegation increases the ability of 
the group to successfully reach the threshold of a collective account only when the 
intermediary’s behavior is limited by the destination rule.
5.3  Subjects’ earnings
We now look at how previous results translate into differences in subjects’ earnings 
across treatments. Figure 2 shows the mean earnings over periods in NoDel, Del and 
DelRule.
Averaging over all periods, subjects earn 133.40 points in NoDel, 128.07 points 
in Del, and 162.13 points in DelRule. Again, we observe a large variability in earn-
ings in NoDel, with downward peaks occurring in the reshuffling periods (1, 5 and 
9) when coordination is more difficult to achieve, and upward peaks reached in the 
subsequent three periods. Again, a plausible interpretation of this pattern is that sub-
jects use (moderate) contributions in the reshuffling periods as a signal to achieve 
coordination in subsequent rounds. The highest earnings are registered in DelRule, 
where group members are more successful in coordinating and contributing above 
the threshold.
These initial observations are formally investigated in Table 4, which shows the 
mean earnings in NoDel, Del and DelRule.
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Over all periods, according to a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test (two-sided), the 
difference between DelRule and both NoDel and Del are significant ( p = 0.034 and 
p = 0.011 , respectively). Again, differences remain significant when accounting for 
multiple null hypotheses testing (for the difference between DelRule and NoDel, 
p = 0.031 ; for the difference between DelRule and Del, p = 0.023 ). The difference 
between Del and NoDel is non significant using either a standard Mann–Whitney 
rank-sum test ( p = 0.874 ) or when accounting for multiple null hypotheses testing 
( p = 0.650 ), suggesting that the lower contributions in Del do not necessarily lead 
to lower average payoffs.
We also consider how mean earnings differ from 110, the payoff associated with 
the no-contribution equilibrium. Only in DelRule do subjects earn significantly 
more than what they could get by entirely allocating the endowment in the private 
account, according to a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test ( p < 0.001 ). In the 
other two treatments, although the difference between earnings and 110 is positive, 
it is only marginally significant (in NoDel: p = 0.078 ; in Del: p = 0.061 ). In the 
reshuffling periods of NoDel, the difference is negative and highly significant (in 
period 1, p < 0.001 ; in period 5, p < 0.001 ; in period 9, p = 0.006 ). Thus, delega-
tion, if sustained by the destination rule, stimulates cooperation among group mem-
bers and increases their earnings.
Result 5 With multiple collective accounts, delegation is profitable and signifi-
cantly increases subjects’ earnings only when it is sustained by the destination rule.
In our experiment, delegation does not impose any administrative cost on group 
members. However, in the real world, administrative and fundraising costs can be 
high and undermine the potential coordination benefits documented in our experi-
ment.15 For instance, according to data made public online,16 the U.S. United Way 
network’s administration/overhead rate is around 14.5%, very competitive with the 
nation’s top 100 nonprofits. Moreover, it is well below industry standards and recom-
mendations (like the 25% rate suggested by the Office of Personnel Management).
Fig. 2  Subjects’ earnings with 
multiple collective accounts, by 
treatment and period
15 We thank an anonymous Referee for this important observation.
16 See the section ”Where does the money go?” at https ://www.unite dway.org/conta ct-us/faqs.
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Given the results in Table 4, it follows that, over all periods, subjects’ earnings 
in DelRule are 21.54% larger than in NoDel, thus suggesting that, in order to nul-
lify the social benefits of delegation, administrative costs should amount to (at least) 
21.54%.
We also parametrically compare the effect of delegation on earnings with the 
benchmark administrative costs. In particular, in the online Appendix (Table A.1) 
we report results from the same econometric specification undertaken in column (1) 
of Table 1, but using the individual earnings as dependent variable and including 
two interactions to account for differences in earnings between the delegate and non 
delegated subjects in Del and DelRule. In addition, since the main effect on earn-
ings are observed in the reshuffling periods, we replicate the same regression by 
including data on periods 1, 5, and 9, only. Our interest focuses on the difference in 
profits when comparing the delegate in DelRule with the generic subject in NoDel. 
Over all periods, the increase in profits of the delegate are 28.66%, large enough to 
compensate both the benchmark administrative costs of 14.5% ( p = 0.176 ) and 25% 
( p = 0.727 ). Moreover, relative to NoDel, even the non delegated subjects register 
a (substantial) increase of 19.16% in their earnings ( p < 0.001 ). Thus, delegation 
in DelRule produces and increase in welfare that goes well above the benchmark 
administrative costs.
The results are even stronger when focusing in the reshuffling periods, namely 
when coordination of donors is much harder to achieve and the intermediaries play a 
larger role in potentially coordinating contributions. Indeed, in this case, relative to 
NoDel, the increase in earnings in DelRule are 94.21% for a non delegated subject 
and 122.36% for the delegate, being the change for the latter category substantially 
higher than benchmark administrative costs (in both cases, p < 0.001).
5.4  Delegated amounts and contributions
The previous results suggest that, in DelRule, delegation may help groups coordi-
nate on a public good and increase their expected payoffs.
Figure 3 shows the amounts delegated by the group members to the intermediary, 
as well as her total contributions to the collective accounts in Del and DelRule.
Fig. 3  Delegated amounts and intermediary’s total contributions with multiple collective accounts, by 
treatment and period
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Three important observations emerge from Fig. 3. First, the amounts transferred 
by group members to the intermediary are higher in DelRule than in Del. Over all 
periods, the mean delegated amounts are 85.44 tokens in DelRule and 47.69 tokens 
in Del, respectively. Second, while the intermediary contributes more than what 
is transferred by the group in DelRule, there is no substantial difference between 
delegated amounts and the intermediary’s total contributions in Del. Over all peri-
ods, the difference between the intermediary’s total contribution and the delegated 
amounts is 24.99 in DelRule and 3.27 in Del. Third, both the delegated amounts and 
the intermediary’s total contributions substantially decay over repetitions in Del, but 
remain stable in DelRule.
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on the delegated amounts and the intermedi-
ary’s total contributions in Del and DelRule over all periods, together with results 
from non-parametric tests.
Over all periods, both the delegated amounts and the intermediary’s total contri-
butions are substantially higher in DelRule than in Del. According to a Mann–Whit-
ney rank-sum test (two-sided), the differences between Del and DelRule in both 
variables are highly significant (for the delegated amounts: p < 0.001 ; for the 
intermediary’s total contributions: p < 0.001 ). These results remain highly signifi-
cant when accounting for multiple null hypotheses testing (for both the delegated 
amounts and the intermediary’s total contributions: p < 0.001).
Next, we compare the intermediary’s total contributions with the transfers 
received from the group members in the first stage. In DelRule, the intermediary 
contributes substantially more than the delegated amounts, while no remarkable dif-
ferences are detected in Del. Indeed, over all periods, the difference between the 
intermediary’s total contribution and the delegated amounts in DelRule is 24.99 
tokens (around 29% of what is transferred by the group) and highly significant 
according to a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test ( p < 0.001 ). In Del the differ-
ence drops to 3.27 tokens and is not significantly different from zero ( p = 0.617).17
Result 6 With multiple collective accounts, the destination rule increases the 
amount transferred by the group members in the delegation phase. Moreover, in 
DelRule, the intermediary’s total contributions are on average 29.25% higher than 
the total amount delegated by the members of the group.
The previous result does not take into account the difference in the propor-
tion of successful groups between DelRule and Del (Result 4). In order to bet-
ter understand the interplay between the intermediary’s total contribution and the 
17 We also investigate whether the intermediary contributes out of her own wallet (namely, net of the 
delegated resources) more than what, on average, other group members invest (namely, the sum between 
the resources transferred to the intermediary in the first phase and the amount contributed in the second 
phase) in the two phases of the experiment. We find that, in both treatments with delegation, the interme-
diary contributes out of her own wallet less than what invested by any of the other group members, with 
the difference being substantially bigger in Del than in DelRule. Indeed, over all periods, the intermedi-
ary contributes out of her wallet, 3.274 in Del and 24.991 in DelRule, while the investment of any other 
group member is 21.119 in Del and 31.798 in DelRule. The difference between intermediary’s contribu-
tion and the average investment of the other group members is highly significant in Del ( p < 0.001 ) and 
significant in DelRule ( p = 0.012).





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public…
delegated amounts, we now focus on groups that successfully reached the thresh-
old of a collective account. For these groups, Fig. 4 shows the delegated amounts, 
the intermediary’s contributions, the contributions made by the other three group 
members, and the group’s aggregate contributions to the financed collective 
account over all periods in DelRule and Del.
The figure provides a number of interesting insights. First, in contrast to Fig. 3, 
we document no substantial difference between Del and DelRule in the group’s 
aggregate contributions, settling in both treatments around 140 tokens. Second, 
successful groups transfer more resources to the intermediary in DelRule than in 
Del, a result that confirms what was reported in Result 6. Third, when focusing 
on successful groups, we document a positive difference between the intermedi-
ary’s contributions and the delegated amounts in both treatments, with its size 
being somewhat bigger in Del than in DelRule. Table 6 formally investigates the 
validity of the previous graphical observations.
According to a (two-sided) Mann–Whitney rank-sum test, over all periods, 
there are no significant differences in group’s aggregate contributions to the 
financed collective account between Del and DelRule ( p = 0.493 ). Nevertheless, 
we document notable differences in the way in which delegation is used in the 
two treatments. First, the presence of the destination rule significantly increases 
the groups’ willingness to transfer money to the intermediary (for the difference 
in the delegated amounts between Del and DelRule, p = 0.002 ). Second, in order 
to reach the threshold and due to the difference in the delegated amounts, the 
intermediary contributes a larger share of her own endowment in Del than in Del-
Rule ( p = 0.014 ). A reasonable explanation of this result is that, by preventing 
expropriation by the intermediary, the destination rule stimulates delegation and, 
therefore, reduces the necessity of the intermediary to use their own money to 
reach the threshold.
Result 7 With multiple collective accounts, the destination rule makes delega-
tion more effective within successful groups: it increases the delegated amounts 
and reduces the necessity for the intermediary to use her own endowment to reach 
the threshold.
Fig. 4  Delegated amounts and contributions to the financed collective account in successful groups with 
multiple alternatives, by treatment and period
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In the Online Appendix, we investigate differences across treatments and deter-
minants of intermediary’s behavior as well as its effect on groups’ inclination to 
cooperate.
First, we show that, over all periods, the proportion of delegates expropriating 
resources is 36.6% in Del, with the large majority of these cases (86.1%) being 
associated with full expropriation,18 and very frequently (81% of the cases) expro-
priation was an efficient decision because the intermediary did not have enough 
resources to meet the threshold. The proportion of intermediaries contributing more 
than what received from the group is substantially larger in DelRule (68.5%) than in 
Del (42.6%), with the difference being highly significant according to a proportion 
test ( p < 0.001 ). We also find that both delegate’s contributions and the probabil-
ity of observing crowding-in positively depend on the delegated amounts, with the 
relationship being particularly pronounced up to the level that allows the intermedi-
ary to reach the threshold. The probability of observing the delegate to expropriate 
resources in Del is stimulated by the delegated amounts, although it substantially 
decreases when the group transfers enough to allow the intermediary to reach the 
threshold.
Second, concerning the effects of delegate’s behavior on groups’ cooperation, 
we find that observing an intermediary expropriating resources in Del substantially 
reduces a group’s contributions and the delegated amounts in subsequent periods. 
On the other hand, in both Del and DelRule, observing an intermediary’s crowding-
in does not exert any relevant effect on the group’s behavior.
5.5  Treatments with a single collective account
In order to investigate the interplay between delegation and multiplicity of public 
goods, we run three additional treatments, NoDel[1], Del[1], and DelRule[1], that 
are analogous to the multiple public good treatments but with only a single collec-
tive account to which players may contribute.
With a single collective account, coordination among donors is likely to be easier 
than in the setting with multiple collective accounts. This is because successfully 
funding a single public good only requires that subjects contribute enough in total 
to reach the threshold; there is no risk that subjects contribute enough to reach a 
threshold, but inefficiently spread their contributions out across different goods. It is 
this aspect of mis-coordination that delegation most-directly addresses. Therefore, 
we expect delegation to be potentially less effective at improving donor coordina-
tion and payoffs in the single public good environment. At the same time, in the 
environment with unrestricted delegation, the risk of expropriation by the intermedi-
ary is independent of the number of collective accounts. Therefore, we expect that 
the lack of a destination rule in a delegation environment has a similar detrimental 
effect on coordination and payoffs with a single public good as it had in the multiple 
18 Namely, the intermediary contributes nothing and entirely expropriates the amounts received from 
group members.
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public good setting. The experimental evidence is generally consistent with these 
expectations.
Figure 5 shows the mean contributions to the single collective account and the 
mean earnings over periods in NoDel[1], Del[1] and DelRule[1].
Averaging over all periods, subjects contribute 30.51 tokens in NoDel[1], 20.63 
in Del[1] and 31.22 tokens in DelRule[1]. In all periods, contributions in DelRule[1] 
are well above those in Del[1], suggesting that even in the setting with a single col-
lective account, the destination rule strongly increases group’s overall contributions. 
No remarkable difference is observed between NoDel[1] and DelRule[1], while con-
tributions in Del[1] are lower than those in the other two treatments.
Table 7 replicates the parametric analysis of Table 1 by using data from the three 
treatments with a single collective account.
From column (1), and in line with the results in the setting with multiple collec-
tive accounts, delegation with no destination rule discourages contributions. Both 
the differences between Del[1] and NoDel[1], and between Del[1] and DelRule[1] 
are negative and highly significant (in the first case, p = 0.003 ; in the second 
case, p = 0.002 ). Again, although positive, the difference between DelRule[1] and 
NoDel[1] is not significant ( p = 0.277 ). These findings are confirmed by non para-
metric tests. According to a two side Mann–Whitney rank-sum test, mean contribu-
tions (over all periods) in Del[1] are significantly lower than those in DelRule[1] 
( p = 0.019 ) and NoDel[1] ( p = 0.025 ), while no difference is detected between Del-
Rule[1] and NoDel[1] ( p = 0.912).
Result 8 With a single collective account, subjects make larger contributions in 
DelRule[1] and NoDel[1] than in Del[1]. There is no significant difference in contri-
butions between DelRule[1] and NoDel[1].
Concerning the other determinants of individual contributions, column (2) con-
firms that even in the setting with a single collective, contributions decline over rep-
etitions (the coefficient of Trend is negative and highly significant, p < 0.001 ) and 
positively respond to the group’s successful provision in the previous period (the 
coefficient of Cood(t − 1) is negative and highly significant, p < 0.001).
Column (3) documents some differences across treatments in the decaying 
pattern and the effects of past successful provision on contributions. In particu-
lar, the interaction term DelRule[1] ∗ Trend is positive and highly significant 
( p < 0.01 ), suggesting that the linear time trend is less pronunced in DelRule[1] 
than in NoDel[1]. Similar conclusions emerge when comparing the coefficient of 
the linear time trend in Del[1] and DelRule[1], as the difference between the two 
interaction terms, DelRule[1] ∗ Trend and Del[1] ∗ Trend , is positive and sig-
nificant ( p = 0.031 ). Moreover, DelRule[1] is the only treatment in which the lin-
ear time trend presents a non significant coefficient (for the linear combination 
of Trend and Del[1] ∗ Trend : p = 0.421 ). When looking at the effects of the past 
successful provision, no difference is detected between NoDel[1] and DelRule[1] 
(for the coefficient of DelRule[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) : p = 0.966 ), while the effect is 
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significantly stronger in Del[1] than in the other two treatments (for the coefficient 
of Del[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) : p = 0.051 ; for the difference between the two interaction 
terms, DelRule[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) and Del[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) , p = 0.039).
Here, there is no reshuffling of the efficient collective accounts. The last three 
columns document no remarkable differences in contributions in periods 1, 5, 9, and 
12, thus confirming that the effects documented in the setting with multiple collec-
tive accounts can be genuinely attributed to the reshuffling procedure used to select 
the four efficient collective accounts.19
With a single collective account, group members do not face the risk of mis-
coordinating contributions to different alternatives. Nevertheless, even in the sin-
gle collective account setting, delegation can potentially stimulate cooperation. For 
instance, by delegating resources, other group members can signal their intention 
to cooperate to reach the threshold and trigger the delegate’s positive response. We 
investigate these considerations in Table 8.
over all periods, DelRule[1] is associated with the highest percent of successful 
contribution (63.9%), followed by NoDel[1] (53.7%) and Del[1] (35.6%). According 
to a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test (two sided), only the difference between Del[1] 
and DelRule[1] is significantly different from 0 ( p = 0.026 ). Instead, the other two 
differences are less pronounced, reaching marginal significance between NoDel[1] 
and Del[1] ( p = 0.069 ) and being not significant between NoDel[1] and Del[1] 
( p = 0.238 ). When accounting for multiple null hypotheses testing, only the differ-
ence between DelRule[1] and Del[1] remains significant ( p = 0.040 ). Thus, with a 
single collective account, delegation is either useless (when comparing DelRule[1] 
with NoDel[1]) or detrimental for successful provision of the collective account 
(when comparing Del[1] with NoDel[1]).
Result 9 With a single collective account, delegation either reduces group’s abil-
ity to reach the threshold when there is no destination rule, or it does not have any 
significant effect when the intermediary’s choices are constrained by the destination 
rule.
Fig. 5  Contributions and earnings with a single collective account, by treatment and period
19 Only in NoDel[1] and Del[1] the coefficient attached to the dummy for period 9 is positive and 
reaches marginal significance, p = 0.092 and p = 0.073 , respectively.
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Table 7  Total contributions with a single collective account: parametric analysis
This table replicates the parametric analysis presented in Table 1 by pooling data from NoDel[1], Del[1], 
and DelRule[1]. Del[1] ∗ Trend , DelRule[1] ∗ Trend , Del[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) , DelRule[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) 
are interaction terms. The other remarks of Table 1 apply
Total contribution (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NoDel[1] Del[1] DelRule[1]
Del[1] − 9.882*** − 7.936*** − 14.481***
(3.349) (2.832) (4.711)
DelRule[1] 0.703 0.765 − 8.028*
(3.349) (2.819) (0.357)
Coord(t − 1) 7.937*** 5.065*
(1.452) (2.607)
Del[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) 7.314*
(3.743)
DelRule[1] ∗ Coord(t − 1) − 0.152
(3.560)
Trend − 1.050*** − 1.777*** − 2.018*** − 1.311*** 0.053
(0.187) (0.357) (0.184) (0.276) (0.593)
Del[1] ∗ Trend 0.545
(0.479)
DelRule[1] ∗ Trend 1.521***
(0.479)
d1 − 1.321 − 1.151 2.018
(1.950) (2.926) (6.284)
d5 1.390 0.564 2.057
(1.699) (2.549) (5.474)
d9 2.949* 4.710* -2.571
(1.748) (2.623) (5.633)
d12 − 2.191 − 2.691 − 4.354
(1.974) (2.961) (6.360)
cons 30.513*** 31.403*** 37.404*** 41.544*** 27.721*** 31.162***
(2.368) (2.497) (3.666) (2.192) (3.427) (3.883)
ll − 12,516.05 − 11,415.19 − 11,407.77 − 3530.07 − 3874.19 − 4500.94
Wald − 2 12.49 91.88 109.58 238.20 47.84 1.11
p > 𝜒2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.953
Obs. 2592 2376 2376 864 864 864
Moving to earnings, the right panel of Fig. 5 and Table 9 report the mean earn-
ings over periods in NoDel[1], Del[1] and DelRule[1].
Averaging over all periods, subjects earn 149.67 points in NoDel[1], 133.58 
points in Del[1], and 162.93 points in DelRule[1]. Del[1] exhibits the worst earn-
ing performance over periods, confirming the fact that, with a single collective 
account and no destination rule, delegation undermines cooperation. According 
to a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test (two-sided), both the difference between Del[1] 
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and NoDel[1] as well as the difference between Del[1] and DelRule[1] are nega-
tive, although only the latter case reaches statistical significance (in the first case: 
p = 0.146 ; in the second case: p = 0.025 ). The difference between Del[1] and Del-
Rule[1] remains significant when accounting for multiple null hypotheses testing 
( p = 0.070).
Result 10 With a single collective account, delegation is detrimental for subjects’ 
earnings: it either reduces earnings when there is no destination rule, or it does not 
affect their level when the intermediary’s choices are constrained by the destination 
rule.
In aggregate, the results from the treatments with a single collective account are 
consistent with our expectations. Delegation with a destination rule is less important 
for facilitating cooperation in the single public good environment than it is in the 
multiple public good environment, as evidenced by the smaller differences between 
the outcomes in DelRule[1] and NoDel[1] than were previously observed between 
DelRule and NoDel. At the same time, the presence of unrestricted delegation in 
Del[1] is detrimental for contributions, coordination and payoffs, just as previously 
observed in Del. The detrimental effects of unrestricted delegation are perhaps even 
more surprising in the single public good environment than it was with multiple 
public goods. Subjects could simply ignore the intermediary; any strategies that 
were possible in the no-delegation environment are also possible in the single public 
good environment. Although this is also true in the multiple threshold public good 
environment, the fact that delegation has less benefit may make ignoring delegation 
a more-salient strategy in the single public good case.20
Table 8  Mean proportion of successful provision with a single collective account
This table reports mean proportions (standard errors of the proportions are reported in parentheses) 
of successful provision – namely, reaching the threshold of one collective account – over periods in 
NoDel[1], Del[1], and DelRule[1]. The other remarks of Table 3 apply
Period 1 1–4 5 5–8 9 9–12 12 All
NoDel[1] 0.833 0.764 0.777 0.542 0.444 0.306 0.167 0.537
(0.088) (0.100) (0.009) (0.117) (0.117) (0.109) (0.088) (0.118)
Del[1] 0.278 0.403 0.444 0.347 0.389 0.319 0.222 0.356
(0.106) (0.117) (0.117) (0.112) (0.115) (0.110) (0.098) (0.113)
DelRule[1] 0.667 0.583 0.722 0.750 0.667 0.583 0.500 0.639
(0.111) (0.116) (0.106) (0.102) (0.111) (0.116) (0.118) (0.113)
NoDel[1]−Del[1] 0.555*** 0.361*** 0.333** 0.195 0.055 − 0.013 − 0.055 0.181*
NoDel[1]−DelRule[1] 0.166 0.181** 0.055 − 0.208* − 0.223 − 0.277** − 0.333** − 0.102
Del[1]−DelRule[1] − 0.389** − 0.180 − 0.278* − 0.403*** − 0.278* − 0.264** − 0.278* − 0.283**
Obs. (per treat) 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
20 In the online Appendix, we also report results on the delegated amounts and the contributions of the 
delegate in Del[1] and DelRule[1]. Even with a single collective account, the destination rule increases 
the delegated amount and on average induces the intermediary to contribute 37.02% more than what is 
transferred by the group.
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That unrestricted delegation leads to worse options even when it could easily be 
ignored suggests that the possibility of delegation increases the perceived risk or 
strategic complexity associated with contributing directly or through the intermedi-
ary. The fact that delegation leads to worse outcomes only in the unrestricted case 
and not with the destination rule suggests that it is not the increased complication to 
the strategic setting introduced by delegation that discourages contributions. Instead, 
the detrimental effects of unrestricted delegation are consistent with an increase in 
the perceived uncertainty about the contributions of others and the risk of essentially 
wasting one’s contributions by directing them to an otherwise underfunded good 
that discourage giving.
By comparing contributions in NoDel and NoDel[1], the analysis in the Online 
Appendix also provides insights into the effects of multiplicity of public goods on 
contributions and coordination. This investigation is closely related to the analysis 
conducted by CCV. Among other results, CCV found that contributions and coor-
dination were significantly lower when subjects faced four identical public goods 
than when they are presented with a single public good; when there were four goods 
and one good stood out as being more efficient than the other three, contributions 
were similar to what was observed in the single public good setting. The current 
multiple public good environment is different from any of the cases considered in 
CCV in that donors face 12 alternative public goods and four of them stand out as 
being more efficient than the other eight. In the current environment, multiplicity 
only plays a marginal role in affecting group performance. Going from an environ-
ment with a single public good to one in which there are 12 public goods and four 
of them stand out as efficient is less detrimental for contributions than going to an 
environment with only four public goods, all equally efficient. We discuss this dif-
ference in more detail in the online Appendix, but we hypothesize that the efficiency 
differences between the public goods leads the subjects to initially shift their focus 
to achieving coordination on an efficient good rather than shifting their attention to a 
no-contribution strategy.
6  Discussion and conclusion
Intermediary NGOs, community chest organizations, Telethons and other philan-
thropic initiatives play prominent roles in charitable giving. They collect contribu-
tions from individual donors and coordinate their efforts across causes and projects. 
Such organizations potentially offer several benefits, from encouraging giving to 
helping donor learn about the most pressing issues. Of particular interest to the cur-
rent paper is the role these organizations play in improving the efficiency of philan-
thropic giving, helping facilitate coordination among donors. Intermediary organi-
zations, for example, can direct donors’ contributions to a select set of programs, 
increasing their chance of making a difference, and reducing the risk that well-inten-
tioned donors spread their contributions too thinly across too many programs and 
causes to have a meaningful impact.
From earlier experiments, we know that such risks of mis-coordination among 
donors can discourage contributions to public goods and lead donors to shy away 
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from charitable giving. This suggests that intermediary organizations, to the extent 
that they reduce the risk of donor mis-coordination, may encourage contributions 
and increase the success of donor supported programs and projects.
The current paper investigates this issue in a series of lab experiments using 
threshold public goods, which require donors to coordinate contributions to be suc-
cessful. This is a similar setting as CCV, except that we add to the environment an 
intermediary player. Others can choose to provide contributions through the inter-
mediary, to contribute directly to any of several public goods, or to not contribute at 
all. The intermediary chooses how to allocate their own resources and the contribu-
tions provided to her by others across goods.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that under the right conditions, the presence of 
an intermediary can increase public good success and overall welfare. More inter-
estingly, however, we show how the presence of an intermediary can also have the 
opposite effect, as it discourages contributions and reduces the probability of public 
goods receiving enough funding to be successful. In our experimental setting, the 
benefit of an intermediary depends on whether or not the intermediary is formally 
committed not to redirect donations received from others to uses that may be ben-
eficial to the intermediary but are not preferred by the donors themselves. Although 
the theoretical analysis shows that formal commitment is not needed for an inter-
mediary for directing delegated contributions to the socially optimal public goods, 
the experimental analysis finds that formal commitment is essential for encouraging 
donor contributions and public good success.
Traditionally, the introduction of destination rules in the nonprofit sector has 
been justified by the necessity to guarantee institutional transparency, justice and 
correspondence between donors’ initial intent and NGOs’ actions. Our results add 
a further economic justification to introduce these formal restrictions. By reducing 
the perceived risk that an NGO could misuse donations, destination rules encourage 
donations, while allowing the intermediary to facilitate coordination across alterna-
tive projects, producing substantial welfare improvements for the society.
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